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The minimal state of consciousness is sentience. This includes any phenomenal
sensory experience – exteroceptive, such as vision and olfaction; interoceptive, such
as pain and hunger; or proprioceptive, such as the sense of bodily position and
movement. We propose unlimited associative learning (UAL) as the marker of the
evolutionary transition to minimal consciousness (or sentience), its phylogenetically
earliest sustainable manifestation and the driver of its evolution. We define and describe
UAL at the behavioral and functional level and argue that the structural-anatomical
implementations of this mode of learning in different taxa entail subjective feelings
(sentience). We end with a discussion of the implications of our proposal for the
distribution of consciousness in the animal kingdom, suggesting testable predictions,
and revisiting the ongoing debate about the function of minimal consciousness in light
of our approach.
Keywords: evolution of associative learning, evolution of consciousness, the distribution problem, learning and
consciousness, evolutionary transitions
“Mind can be understood only by showing how mind is evolved”
(Spencer, 1890, p. 291).
INTRODUCTION
One way to study a major evolutionary change, such as the transition to consciousness, would be
to discover a trait that is necessary for the transition. This would make it possible to identify the
evolutionarily most elementary form of consciousness that is free of the baggage of later-evolved
structures and processes. The transition from inanimate matter to life shares interesting conceptual
parallels with the emergence of consciousness. We use the approach of the Hungarian theoretical
chemist Gánti (1975) and Gánti et al. (2003) to the study of minimal life as a heuristic for the
study of the evolutionary transition to consciousness (for a detailed discussion of this heuristics see
Ginsburg and Jablonka, 2015).
Gánti started by compiling a list of properties that jointly characterize minimal life and
constructed a toy model (the chemoton) instantiating them. He suggested that one of the capacities
of a minimal life system could be used as a marker of the evolutionary transition to sustainable
minimal life. His specific suggestion, which was later sharpened and developed by Szathmáry and
Maynard Smith (1995), was that the capacity for unlimited heredity marks the transition from
non-life to sustainable life: only a system capable of producing hereditary variants that far exceed
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the number of potential challenges it is likely to face would
permit long-term persistence of traits and cumulative evolution.
Moreover, a system enabling unlimited heredity requires that the
information-carrying subsystem is maintained by self-sustaining
metabolic dynamics enclosed by a membrane – features like
those exhibited by a proto-cell, an acknowledged minimal living
system. Hence, once a transition marker is identified it allows the
“reverse engineering” of the system that enables it.
In a previous work, we followed Gánti’s example by
presenting a list of properties deemed individually necessary
and jointly sufficient for characterizing minimal consciousness.
We identified a putative evolutionary transition marker to
minimal consciousness and characterized it at the behavioral
level (Bronfman et al., 2016). Here, we build on our previous
work, and further develop our theory regarding the evolution of
consciousness. We begin by briefly summarizing our approach
and setting the theoretical background for our proposal. Next,
we characterize the suggested transition marker at the functional
level, showing that the system underlying it has all the properties
that jointly characterize consciousness. We then compare our
approach to other leading theories of consciousness. Next, we
review the distribution of the suggested transition marker in the
animal kingdom, and conclude that it has emerged independently
in three animal phyla. Finally, we point to the conceptual and
ethical implications of our proposal.
CHARACTERIZING FEATURES OF
MINIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS
On the basis of a survey of studies of consciousness by
philosophers of mind, psychologists, cognitive scientists and
neuroscientists, we compiled a list of seven consciousness-
characteristics that when jointly present, seem to capture the
essence of minimal consciousness. Minimal consciousness refers
to the most basic form of sensory phenomenal experience,
such as seeing red (and experiencing redness), or feeling pain.
This (basic) form of consciousness is distinct from high-order
consciousness, which includes, in addition to the phenomenal
experience itself, self-referential, or reflective (usually linguistic)
content, such as the awareness of the thought that one is
experiencing a red color (see discussion by Edelman, 2003; Block,
2005).
Although the emphases on the foundational properties of
consciousness made by different investigators differ and the
items on the list we present below are partially overlapping, this
list represents a broad consensus (for a detailed discussion see
Bronfman et al., 2016).
The characterizing features we identified are:
(1) Flexible value systems and goals that reflect or give rise to the
motivational values of the organism’s ever-changing internal
states and actions (e.g., Block, 1995; Panksepp, 2005; Denton,
2006; Damasio, 2010; Dickinson, 2010).
(2) Unity and diversity through sensory binding leading to
the formation of a compound stimulus; the multiple
underlying features of the compound are coherently
and conjointly perceived, rather than each feature being
perceived independently (see discussions in Tononi and
Edelman, 1998; Engel et al., 2001; Llinás and Ribary, 2001;
Crick and Koch, 2003).
(3) Global availability of information, involving multidirectional
feedback and reentrant interactions that generate a state
in which information is available to different specialized
cognitive processes (Baars, 1993) that are otherwise
“computationally isolated” (e.g., (Dehaene et al., 1998;
Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Seth et al., 2005; Dehaene,
2014).
(4) Temporal thickness – the temporal persistence of mental
states (e.g., James, 1890; Edelman, 1993; Lamme and
Roelfsema, 2000; Crick and Koch, 2003; Shadlen and Kiani,
2013).
(5) Selection – involvement of processes of exploration and
selective stabilization at different levels (neural, behavioral),
including processes of action selection and selective attention
(e.g., James, 1890; Changeux and Danchin, 1976; Edelman,
1987; Freeman, 2000; Merker, 2007; Fernando et al., 2010).
(6) Intentionality (aboutness) (e.g., Brentano, 1874; Searle,
1983; Freeman, 2000, 2003). There are processes of
representation/referral; inputs from the body and the world
are “mapped” onto dynamic perception and action models
that are necessary for the constitution of phenomenal
consciousness.
(7) Self and embodiment – no account of consciousness is
possible without addressing the obvious fact that there is
an agent that is sentient: it is the animal rather than its
nervous system that is minimally conscious (for an insightful
and detailed discussion see Merker, 2007, 2013). Various
interactions of the brain with the physical body (beyond
the brain), such as neuro-hormonal relations (e.g., Malenka
et al., 2009), bioelectric fields (e.g., Levin, 2013) and neuro-
immunological interactions (e.g., Schwartz and Kipnis, 2011)
constitute the rich sense of self in animals. However, current
models of agency or self-construction are still preliminary.
We therefore focus here on the animal’s ability to form
a representation of its body as distinct from the external
world, yet embedded in it, as these dynamics are relatively
well-understood, and are thought by many to lead to a
sense of agency and “ownership” of the animal’s experiences
(O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Merker, 2007, 2013; Thompson,
2007; Metzinger, 2009; Damasio, 2010; Seth, 2013; Seth and
Friston, 2016).
The above “list” can be a basis for the construction a model
of minimal consciousness which instantiates and generates the
above features. We believe that at present we are far from such
a generative model, although several models, based mainly on
the mammalian system, have been suggested and are compatible
with the list (e.g., Edelman, 2003; Freeman, 2003; Damasio, 2010;
Dehaene, 2014), and so is the more general vertebrate-based
model suggested by Merker (2007). A more roundabout way,
which we adopt here, is to start from a characterization of an
evolutionary transition marker of minimal consciousness as a
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first step toward “reverse engineering” the (minimally conscious)
system that enables it.
UNLIMITED ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING,
ITS FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURES AND
THE STRUCTURES IMPLEMENTING IT
Our proposed evolutionary marker for the transition from non-
sentient to sentient life is the capacity for unlimited associative
learning (UAL) (Ginsburg and Jablonka, 2015; Bronfman et al.,
2016). With UAL the number of associations among stimuli, and
the number of possible reinforced actions that can be generated,
is practically limitless. We begin by defining associative learning
in general and then describe UAL at the behavioral, functional
and structural levels. Next, we demonstrate how the various
properties of the processes that generate the capacity for UAL
parallel the properties of consciousness, and argue that sentience
first emerged in the context of selection for UAL during the
Cambrian era.
Associative learning (AL; see Macphail and Bolhuis, 2001 for
a detailed discussion) involves the formation of a conditional (if-
then) association between a conditioned stimulus (CS; e.g., the
sound of a buzzer) and a reinforcing unconditioned stimulus
(US) that elicits a physiological and motor response (e.g., food
elicits salivation) (“Pavlovian” or “classical conditioning”), or
between actions (e.g., pressing a lever) and their reinforcing
outcomes (e.g., food) (“instrumental” or “operant conditioning”).
However, in most conditions animals learn both about the
world and their own behavior, a point which was stressed by
early psychologists (reviewed in Rescorla and Solomon, 1967).
Consider a case of classical conditioning when a particular cue
(e.g., a particular smell) that predicts the presence of a prey
elicits in the animal a reflex biting reaction (the UR). The actual
reflex response must be tailored to the specific prey that the cue
predicts (its size, its texture, etc.), and the animal learns both
which cue predicts the prey and the modified UR (the CR) that
the cue elicits. More generally, when the CR is not identical to
the UR (it is a modification of it that is specific to the eliciting
CS, which is very often the case when the UR is a locomotor-
pattern), learning the CR is part of what the animal learns.
With operant conditioning, the animal learns not only about its
action (that pressing a lever is reinforcing) but also about the
lever itself as a stimulus predicting reinforcement. We therefore
prefer the conceptually clear (though idealized) distinction
between self-learning (learning only about the consequences of
one’s own actions – about how things are learned) and world
learning (learning about what there is in the world through
the reinforcing effects of relations between stimuli in the world
that are independent of one’s own action; the distinction was
suggested by Colomb and Brembs, 2010).
Whether learning about self or world or both, the stimuli that
enter into conditional association can include “neutral” stimuli
(which under ordinary conditions do not trigger a response),
biologically important stimuli such as those involved in the
maintenance of basic homeostatic and reproductive functions,
the animal’s own actions, including stereotyped or novel actions,
and the contexts in which particular stimuli and responses
occur. Moreover, AL is, according to all definitions, “predictive.”
Because the CS (e.g., the sound of a buzzer) repeatedly precedes
the US (e.g., the smell of food), it comes to “predict” the response
(salivation). The extent to which the organism anticipates the
reinforcement when the CS occurs influences the strength
of learning. Only unanticipated events lead to learning. The
greater the difference between expected and actual reinforcement,
the greater the differential learning success (this difference is
called the prediction error (PE) (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972;
Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000).
The blocking paradigm (Kamin, 1969), demonstrates how the
presentation of a perfectly predicted reward does not generate a
prediction-error and hence fails to generate new learning.
Here we focus on a specific form of world and self associative-
learning that we call UAL, and distinguish it from simpler, more
limited forms of associative learning. Although there are taxon-
specific and ecology-specific constraints on the associability of
different classes of compound stimuli, UAL greatly expands
the range of stimuli and actions an animal can learn. We will
argue that this expansion is generated by interacting mechanisms
that construct a system whose properties are the same as
those considered individually necessary and jointly sufficient
for a system exhibiting minimal consciousness (which we listed
above). We begin by defining UAL at the behavioral (overt) level,
and then describe its underlying mechanisms and its functional
architecture.
For UAL to occur, the following conditions must be met:
(i) The conditional stimulus (CS) or the reinforced actions are
compound – i.e., consist of several features or action-patterns
that are learned only as a whole, rather than separately. With
compound associative learning (also known as spontaneous
configuration; Razran, 1965; Bellingham and Gillette, 1981;
or perceptual fusion; Konorski, 1967), an animal learns to
associate a particular combination of color, shape, texture
and smell to reinforcement (e.g., food). It thus learns to
respond (e.g., salivate) upon future exposure to it, but it
will not respond to each of the features when presented
separately (e.g., only the shape) and will not even respond
to a different spatial or temporal combination of the same
features. An example of compound learning, also called non-
elemental learning, occurs when the animal can learn that
two different stimuli are associated separately with a negative
reinforcement (A−, B−), whereas the compound stimulus is
associated with a positive reinforcement (AB+) (Young et al.,
2011). Another manifestation of non-elemental learning
is discrimination learning, in which the animal learns to
associate a particular reinforcement only with a specific
compound pattern of stimuli (Watanabe et al., 1995; for
sophisticated experiments showing the necessary role of the
hippocampus in non-elemental learning in vertebrates, see
Honey et al., 2014). Similarly, with compound instrumental
learning a particular combination of action-patterns is
learned by reinforcing the particular overall pattern, whereas
a single action or a compound action made up of the same
action patterns but in a different temporal order, is not.
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(ii) The conditional stimulus or the reinforced actions are novel –
i.e., they are neither reflex-eliciting nor pre-associated with
a US or with past reinforcement. (For example, prior to
learning, the sight of blue flowers with yellow spots does not
elicit any observable aversive response.)
(iii) The learned conditional stimulus or the reinforced
sequence of actions can subsequently support second-order
conditioning (e.g., Rescorla and Holland, 1976; Gewirtz and
Davis, 2000), acting as a US or as a reinforcement in future
learning.
Note that according to the above description, many instances
of AL are not UAL. For example, Aplysia californica is only
capable of modifying the strength of preexisting associations
between reflex-eliciting stimuli, and thus its mode of AL does
not meet condition ii (see Carew et al., 1981; Hawkins et al.,
1983; Brembs et al., 2002; Hawkins and Byrne, 2015 provide a
review). The nematode Caenorhabditis elegans too does not fulfill
the conditions for UAL: it has never been shown to be able to
learn in a non-elemental manner; it can only form associations
between each underlying feature of a compound stimulus and
the reinforcement; hence it does not meet condition i. (For
a discussion of further limitations of C. elegans’s capacity for
learning see Bhatla, 2014.)
Three intertwined mechanisms are required for UAL: First,
to enable compound learning, the compound (consisting of the
specific configuration of the underlying elements or features)
must be constructed via some form of intramodal and/or
intermodal binding or feature-integration mechanisms that
lead to the formation of a compound stimulus. In such a
compound stimulus, multiple underlying features are coherently
and conjointly experienced as opposed to each property/feature
being perceived separately or in a different configuration. Binding
requires multi-level hierarchical coding, with succeeding layers
of the coding hierarchy increasing the specificity and quality
of the percept (e.g., Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Senkowski
et al., 2008). Furthermore, the hierarchical coding necessary
for UAL must be predictive: as discussed above, studies of
associative learning have shown that the strength of associative
learning is not based on temporal contiguity alone. PE – the
difference between actual and predicted reinforcement – is a
key factor in modulating learning (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972;
Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Schultz and Dickinson,
2000). One general theoretical account of this key concept is
provided by hierarchical predictive coding theory, according
to which one of the organism’s biggest challenges is to infer
the (hidden) world-causes that give rise to the (observable)
sensory signals the animal receives (Summerfield et al., 2006;
Friston, 2009; Clark, 2013, 2015; Hohwy, 2013). To achieve
this, the most efficient strategy is to constantly compare signals
arriving from ‘low-level’ sensors (bottom–up information) with
expectations generated at higher levels of processing (top–
down, prior probabilistic models). Any discrepancy between the
expected and actual signals is a prediction-error that leads to
an adjustment of the expectations at the higher level. Thus,
the organism is continuously predicting sensory signals and
minimizing the discrepancy between its predictions and the
actual signals. Such computations are implemented by assuming
bi-directional connections (feed-forward and feedback) between
two or more neural ensembles or units at different hierarchical
levels.
Another equally fundamental type of PE is related to
prospective actions. Any mobile animal must be able to
distinguish between the sensory effects of its own actions and
those originating from the outside world, independent of its
actions: it must be able to predict the sensory effects of its
actions and discount them. A relatively simple strategy is seen in
animals such as nematodes or sea slugs (which can only reinforce
stereotypic innate actions): a copy of the motor command that
is sent to the muscles is also sent as an inhibitory signal,
called “efferent copy” or “corollary discharge,” to sensory neural
units, so that the animal inhibits the reflex reaction that its
own movements would otherwise elicit (Holst and Mittelstaedt,
1971; Brembs and Heisenberg, 2000; Brembs, 2008; Craspe
and Sommer, 2008). Hence, as with blocking, this reafference
process can be implemented at the level of peripheral circuits.
However, even an animal that can learn about association
of only reflex-bound, non-compound stimuli must be able to
block conditioned responses. In animals that exhibit complex
and variant trains of actions, reafference must be based on
the updating of proprioceptive models. (Peripheral and central
reafference are reviewed in Craspe and Sommer, 2008; for a
general discussion of reafference in the context of the predictive
hierarchical coding framework see Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015; see
Merfeld, 2001 for an early discussion of reafference and conscious
body dynamics).
Second, with UAL reinforcement cannot be based only
on the inherent reward/punishment value of the inputs or
actions because, by definition, the valence or “value” of a novel
compound stimulus or action is underdetermined by innate
factors alone. The reinforcement/value system must take into
consideration the overall homeostatic state of the animal. We use
the term “value” in Krichmar’s and Edelman’s sense, to denote
“neural structures that are needed for an organism to modify
its behavior according to the salience of an environmental cue”
(Krichmar and Edelman, 2002, p. 818; the “value” of a stimulus
or an action should therefore be understood in a third-person
sense). Moreover, the value-system must accommodate the ability
for second-order learning, with each learned association sub-
serving future learning of additional novel stimuli and actions.
When occurring in the context of the ability for compound
learning of novel stimuli and actions, second-order conditioning
allows highly flexible adaptations to new environments (see
discussion and examples in Bronfman et al., 2016). In mammals,
the value system is implemented by several midbrain and cortical
circuits and is based on dopamine neurons. These neurons signal
reward prediction-error in a temporally precise manner, For
example, in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) dopamine neurons
are (i) excited by unexpected reward; (ii) unaltered by expected
reward; and (iii) inhibited when expected reward is omitted
(Schultz et al., 1997). In addition, the strength of their response
correlates positively with the magnitude of the PE (see Schultz,
2013, for a review; for a discussion of the role of dopamine in
aversive fear learning see Abraham et al., 2014).
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Third, a distinct memory system for storing and recognizing
compound patterns must be in place. Such dedicated memory
systems have been identified in vertebrates, arthropods and
cephalopods and some homologous structures have been
observed in annelids, platyhelminths and nemerteans and
even aceols (Strausfeld and Hirth, 2013; Wolff and Strausfeld,
2016). Such systems are necessary for memory-based predictive
coding that requires the retrieval of memory traces (engrams)
of associatively learned compound patterns upon which the
perceptual expectation is reconstructed. A putative memory-
based predictive-coding retrieval mechanism was recently
identified in the human hippocampus, where engrams of
compound patterns are identified (or completed, in situations in
which the input is partial), and then sent to the cortex in order
to construct perceptual predictions regarding the sensory inputs
(Hindy et al., 2016).
The models depicted in Figure 1 attempt to unify these
considerations and to schematize the functional architecture of
an animal exhibiting UAL by showing the relations between
these three types of functions in the context of associative
learning. Both models – Figure 1A depicting idealized world-
learning and Figure 1B depicting idealized self-learning – have
the same architecture, the difference between them being that
in Figure 1B learning starts with reinforced motor exploration,
while Figure 1A assumes that although action initiates perception
the action is not reinforced. Figure 1C depicts the typical
situation in which both self and world learning occur. Note that
the units in the model are described at the functional level, and
are not necessarily distinct anatomical units. It is possible, at least
in some cases, that several functions could rely on partially, or
even entirely overlapping neural structures, so that one neural
unit can implement more than one functional system. For
example, the recognition and memorization of compound smells
processed in the mushroom bodies of insects is implemented
through associations between valence (dopaminergic) signals,
sensory units and integration units (Stopfer, 2014).
The basic functional architecture presented in Figure 1 is,
of course, only a schematic and simplified representation of a
system that can implement UAL, and there are many properties
that it does not show. First, it does not show second-order
conditioning, although the model can readily account for such
conditioning. Since many stimuli can lead to the excitation of
SIU, a second compound CS can become primed for activity
by the original, already reinforced compound CS, providing
that the first and second compound stimuli are temporally
contiguous and a non-zero PE is generated. Second, an actual
biological system – an animal’s brain – is made up of more
levels of integration for processing compound stimuli. (What is
a compound at one level is a component of a compound for a
higher level.) Mapping – of the external world, the body, and
action – has more levels than suggested by our simple illustration.
Third, the capacity for trace conditioning, whereby the US
follows the CS after a minute or more is not explicitly depicted
in the model. Fourth, many “background” factors such as the
constraints imposed by the morphology of the body, the role of
epigenetic memory within neurons and the neuro-hormonal and
neuro-immunological interactions that shape reinforcement and
FIGURE 1 | Models of first-order UAL. Functional units are depicted as
circles; receptors and effectors are depicted as squares. Solid arrows denote
bottom-up and lateral interactions; dashed arrows denote top–down
interactions. The ellipses are the local loci of conjunction. I, II, and III are
distinct hierarchical functional levels. R, receptor (e.g., retinal cell); M, effector
(e.g., Muscle); S, primary units processing sensory information; CPG, Central
Pattern Generator; SIU, Sensory Integrating Unit (all sensory exteroceptive
and interoceptive information); MIU, Motor (action) Integrating Unit
(Continued)
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FIGURE 1 | Continued
(proprioceptive and interocpetive information); REIU, Reinforcing Integrating
Unit; AU, Association Unit (motor-sensory integration); MEMU, dedicated
Memory Unit. (A) World learning. Following an animal’s activity (e.g., saccades
and exploratory touch) at time T1, a compound CS (e.g., a black, round and
rigid ball) is processed in the sensory integrating unit, SIU. The CS comprises
several perceptual elements received by receptors R1,2,3 and processed by
sensory neural units S1,2,3. The construction of the compound stimulus (in
the SIU unit, blue) is obtained via hierarchical predictive coding: the novel
aspects of bottom-up information (depicted by ascending solid black arrows)
are combined with top–down predictions (depicted by dashed curved arrows),
based on available perceptual information in SIU, and on mnemonic and
contextual information in the memory unit, MEMU (green). At T2, a reinforcing
stimulus (a US such as food) activates the reinforcing unit, REIU (red), via
receptor R4 and sensory unit S4. The SIU, MIU and the REIU systems activate
the association unit, AU (violet), that constructs the updated model of the
world at T2, and sends a PE to the local association unit (the ellipse). The
PE is based on the discrepancy signal sent from the SIU and the EC (efference
copy) signal sent from MIU [PE is the difference between the received reward
λ, and the reward prediction V at time T1, λ(t) – V(t)]. When the discrepancy
is non-zero, the strength of the association between the SIU and MIU will
increase in proportion to the magnitude of the prediction error. This association
circuit reconstructs engrams in MEMU. When the REIU activates the motor
integrating unit MIU, it sends a signal to the effector, leading to the response
via the activation of a lower-level central pattern generator unit (CPG1), which
activates the effector M1. On later encounters with the stimulus, the SIU-
MIU relation is primed for activity by the MEMU engrams. As a result, the
compound CS will now elicit the adaptive M1 activity. (B) Self-learning. At
time T1, a compound action carried out by M1 (e.g., pressing a button,
turning a dial, and jumping) is originated by unit MIU, based on temporal
and spatial combinations of various action patterns (implemented by central
pattern generators, CPGs). This compound action pattern, which is influenced
by past behaviors (engrams in MEMU), has reinforcing effects depending on
present context, and is memorized both at the level of the local circuit (ellipse)
and in the dedicated memory unit MEMU. As in A, the relation between the
compound motor pattern and the reinforcer is processed in AU, which send
a PE to the association locus. (C) Combination of self and world learning,
typical of most classical and operant conditioning. The action results in an
altered world-state, which in turn leads to the perception of a compound CS at
time T2 (same process as in A). If at time T3 reinforcement of both compound
movement pattern and compound percept occurs, prediction-errors that are
sent to the association loci between MIU and SIU are strengthened, and both
the compound CS percept the compound action pattern directed toward it will
be learned.
integration, are not explicitly included in the model (Bronfman
et al., 2014).
Each of the high-order functional systems (II and III in the
figure) integrates and computes vast amounts of information.
The SIU system can be considered as a model of the extra-brain
environment (world and body) and the MIU system as a model
of prospective actions (that interacts with a model of the body).
These systems are influenced by the outputs from the MEMU that
reflect the animal’s past history, and outputs from the current
homeostatic state monitored by the REIU. The REIU assigns
reinforcement value to percepts and actions according to the
deviation of the system from a state of homeostasis computed
by the AU system. So for thirsty, dehydrated animal water is
a strong reinforcer whereas for one that is fully hydrated it is
not. Similarly, complex actions require a model of prospective
movements that provide inputs to a model of the animals’ body.
The proprioceptive and perceptual body models interact (e.g.,
through reafference) as the animal responds to the model of the
external world that it had constructed. All these are modulated,
and, in turn, modulate, the compound memory unit. This is
necessary if a mobile animal is to react to the world in a manner
that goes beyond learning through sensitization, habituation
and limited associative learning. Note that in addition to the
effects of binding in the SIU and MIU systems that affect the
construction of engrams in MEMU, the association system, which
represents the relationship between SIU and MIU, reconstructs
corresponding engrams in MEMU as well. UAL therefore entails
the coupling of several functional systems that are influenced by
the animal’s past history and that are represented in (one or more)
dedicated memory units.
The UAL model can be readily reformulated within the general
predictive coding framework suggested by Friston (2009). A prior
is a top–down signal, shaped by the animal’s evolution and
past learning (e.g., descending signals from SIU to S’s), which
constrains and modifies the ascending signals of a lower unit. The
ascending signals – when different from the learned state – can be
interpreted as “PEs” (e.g., ascending signals for S’s to SIU). The
reliability of the PEs (termed “precision”) is calculated at each
level through lateral inhibitions of alternative stimuli-response
relations (these are not shown in the model), which prevent the
blurring of the PEs by other competing signaling circuits.
The neural-bodily architecture that this requires has been only
partially deciphered in different animal taxa. Nevertheless, some
neural structures that implement this functional organization
have been identified in vertebrates, many arthropods and some
mollusks (Table 1). In mammals and other vertebrates, several
structures of the cerebral cortex and of the midbrain (including
the colliculi, the hippocampus, basal ganglia and hypothalamus)
and several additional subcortical areas, including the amygdala
and the thalamus, are crucial for compound perception and
action as well as for assigning overall value and motivating the
animal to act (Merker, 2007). Similarly interacting brain centers,
analogous or homologous to these vertebrate regions, are present
in invertebrate phyla such as arthropods and some annelids (for
details see Tomer et al., 2010; Strausfeld and Hirth, 2013; Barron
and Klein, 2016; Klein and Barron, 2016).
The largest part of the insect brain, the protocerebrum,
contains the mushroom bodies (MB) and the central complex
(CX), which is believed to be homologous to the hippocampus
and basal ganglia in vertebrates and are necessary for the
storage of compound patterns and for integrated perception and
motivation. Similarly, the hemiellipsoid bodies of crustaceans
are functionally homologous to the hippocampus (Wolff and
Strausfeld, 2016). In cephalopod mollusks such as octopus
and cuttlefish, two brain structures, the vertical lobe and the
superior frontal lobe, form complex networks that are jointly
analogous to the vertebrate hippocampus. These integrating
brain structures serve as the basis for cephalopod learning and
memory (Shomrat et al., 2011; Hochner, 2013). In gastropod
mollusks the interactions between sensory integrating units,
memory units for the storage of perception and action-patterns,
and a flexible value system, do not seem to form similar multilevel
processing. However, we believe that the terrestrial gastropods
Helix and Limax might exhibit UAL, since the procerebral (PC)
lobes of these land snails are involved in relatively advanced
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forms of learning (enabling blocking and second-order AL)
and the land snail olfactory memory resembles mammalian
mechanisms at several processing levels (Watanabe et al., 2008).
Hence, one cannot rule out the possibility that their neural
architecture can support sentience. More information is needed,
however, about the learning capacities of animals in these groups
as well as their ability to integrate sensory stimuli and generate
compound actions. In animals that can learn only on the basis
of pre-existing reflexes such as the sea-slugs Aplysia californica
and Pleurobranchaea californica, complex neural hierarchy has
not been found and the integrative structures seem unspecialized
(Gillette and Brown, 2015; Hawkins and Byrne, 2015). Hence it
seems that all vertebrates, many arthropods, and some mollusks
have all the neural structures necessary to support UAL. For some
animal phyla we lack sufficient information about the relevant
structures or have information for only some of these structures
(e.g., Wolff and Strausfeld, 2016). In other phyla, such as flat
worms and nematodes, there is no evidence for the presence
of such structures. This is consistent with the behavioral data
showing no evidence for UAL in these groups.
The existing information about the animals in taxa that
show the defining attributes of UAL, or exhibit complex learned
behaviors that can be considered as indicators for UAL (such as
an ability to learn rules, or navigate a complex novel terrain)
is patchy (see Table 2). The data are nevertheless compatible
with the conclusions drawn from the anatomical data. Limited
AL but no UAL was found in nematodes (Ardiel and Rankin,
2010). Bhatla (2014) found conditioning only when the CS
and US co-occurred, so conditioning in this groups may be
conditional sensitization. No UAL has been found in aplysiid
mollusks (Marinesco et al., 2003; Hoover et al., 2006), flat worms
(Jacobson et al., 1967; Nicolas et al., 2008; Prados et al., 2013) or
annelids (Crisp and Burrell, 2009; Shain, 2009). In echinoderms
elemental (limited) conditioning has been reported but the
necessary controls for distinguishing AL from sensitization were
not performed (McClintock and Lawrence, 1982). In cnidarians,
the single experiment reporting limited conditioning (Haralson
et al., 1975) was not replicated. Torley (2007) conducted
a literature search supplemented by personal inquiries from
leading scientists working on learning in cnidarians and was
unable to find any study that demonstrated conditioning in
cnidarians.
THE ATTRIBUTES OF UAL INSTANTIATE
THE PROPERTIES OF MINIMAL
CONSCIOUSNESS
Based on the behavioral and functional characterization of UAL
presented in the previous section, we suggest that the properties
listed in section 1 are also individually necessary and jointly
sufficient for the construction of a UAL system.
(1) Flexible value systems and goals. Although any form of
associative learning entails values and goals, with UAL these
become extremely flexible and variable. Through perceptual
fusion all stimuli can be associated with reinforcement, and
through cumulative (second-order) learning, the organism’s
value system is recursively adjustable: following experience,
numerous stimuli can serve as potential USs, signaling value
in subsequent learning. The flexible value-reinforcement
system must provide a common currency of overall sensory
evaluations for reward and punishments to enable motivated
behavior. As a result, the animal’s behavior becomes directed
to many more goals than that of an animal lacking UAL. In
addition to modifying its behavior in light of phylogenetically
inherited goals (arrived at through classical reflexes and
innate exploratory behaviors), the animal can acquire new
goals and sub-goals during ontogeny.
(2) Unity and diversity through feature integration (binding).
By definition, UAL requires binding. Since with UAL
specific configuration of features can be learned, this
suggests that UAL must rely on neural mechanisms that
enable integration, identification and discrimination among
compound stimuli that differ in their specific conjunction
of underlying features within and across modalities (Razran,
1965; Over and Mackintosh, 1969; Bellingham and Gillette,
1981; Edwards et al., 1982; Colombo and Graziano, 1994;
Watanabe et al., 1995). As suggested long ago, discrimination
is tightly related both to consciousness (e.g., James, 1890;
Edelman, 2001; Crick and Koch, 2003) and to the evolution
of complex forms of learning (Wells, 1968; Razran, 1971).
Selection for increased discrimination ability probably drove
the evolution of binding. In addition to perceptual binding,
UAL entails binding of action-patterns, which are learned, as
a whole, rather than each action separately.
(3) Global accessibility of information. With UAL, a compound
stimulus is associated with reinforcement via hierarchical
bi-directional interactions, such as those implemented
by predictive coding. These dynamics entail complex,
reciprocal flow of information, in which bottom–up sensory
information is compared with top–down “expectations” (see
Figure 1). The top–down “expectations” are by definition
global (non-local), as they depend upon more than a single
input, and similarly, affect more than a single specific output
and exclude the effects of others.
(4) Unity through integration and exclusion, and global
accessibility are the features of consciousness highlighted by
Tononi’s information-integration theory (IIT; Tononi, 2004;
Tononi et al., 2016). According to the IIT, the degree to which
information is integrated in the system (across the system’s
sub-components) above and beyond the sum of information
integrated at each sub-component, reflects the system’s
consciousness level (measured by an index termed 8).
Compound pattern formation and hierarchical predictive
coding are prominent examples of information-integration
dynamics. However, whereas a high level of information-
integration may be a necessary feature of consciousness, it is
not a sufficient condition for it. A specific type of integration
is necessary for sentience (we suggest that it is the type
of integration presented in Figure 1). Additional properties
such as goal-directedness and flexible values that take into
account the physiological and external context (and further
properties listed below) must be explicitly considered as well.
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TABLE 2 | Groups exhibiting UAL, or learned behaviors that can be seen as proxies of UAL.
Learning type Phylum References (reviews and sample original papers)∗
Pavlovian conditioning (involving perceptual fusion);
Operant conditioning (involving novel action patterns and
spatial learning)
Mollusks BOOK: Menzel and Benjamin, 2013 (chapters 14–22 gastropods; chapters
23–25 cephalopods); BOOK: Mather et al., 2010 (octopus); REVIEW: Hochner
et al., 2006 (octopus); Boal et al., 2000 (octopus); Jozet-Alves et al., 2013
(Cuttlefish) Watanabe et al., 2008 (gastropods); General BOOK: Corning et al.,
1973 (vol. 2, chapter 10, vol. 3, chapter 11); REVIEW: Perry et al., 2013;
Pavlovian conditioning with compound CSs (involving
non-elemental learning); Operant conditioning (involving
novel action patterns and spatial learning); Conceptual
learning;a Number-based learning;b Navigation learning;c
Arthropods BOOK: Galizia et al., 2012 (part VI, honeybee); Bhagavan and Smith, 1997
(honeybee); Brembs and Heisenberg, 2001 (Drosophila); Young et al., 2011
(Drosophila); Mizunami et al., 2013 (cockroaches); Collett et al., 2013 (mainly
hymneopterans); Collett and Collett, 2009 (insects); Boisvert and Sherry, 2006
(bumble bee); Magee and Elwood, 2013 (shore crabs); General BOOK: Menzel
and Benjamin, 2013 (chapter 26 crustacea; chapters 27–42 insects); BOOK:
Giurfa et al., 2011 (pp. 5–101, insects); BOOK: Corning et al., 1973 vol. 2,
chapters 5–9); REVIEW: Perry et al., 2013;
Pavlovian conditioning with compound CSs (including
non-elemental learning); Operant conditioning (involving
novel action patterns and spatial learning); Conceptual
learning;a Number-based learning;b Navigation learning;c
Vertebrates Agrillo et al., 2010 (fish); Schumacher et al., 2016 (fish); Newport et al., 2014
(fish); General BOOKS: Macphail, 1982, 1987 (all vertebrates); BOOK: Razran,
1971 (mainly mammals); REVIEW: Moore, 2004 (mainly birds and mammals);
REVIEW: Perry et al., 2013.
*The literature on complex learning abilities in mollusks, arthropods and vertebrates is vast, but the number of species investigated for compound learning is a very
small sample of the species in each of these phyla. We present here books and comprehensive reviews that cover much of the literature on the subject, as well as a
sample of original papers. It should be noted that in some cases there is still a controversy about particular cognitive abilities of specific species. For example, there it
is as-yet unsettled whether or not honeybees exhibit blocking (see Blaser et al., 2004, 2006; Guez and Miller, 2008). a Includes: the transfer of a learned rule to other
samples (e.g., matching a new stimulus to a previously encountered sample); comparing stimuli in different sensory modalities, and learning relations such as “same” and
“different.” bAbility to distinguish between the number/amount of cues presented. cA combination of classical conditioning of landmark cues and operant conditioning of
proprioceptive cues (e.g., step “counting”).
(5) Temporal thickness. The formation of compound percepts
via hierarchical predictive coding entailed by UAL,
requires temporal durability because the multi-directional
reverberating processes described in Figure 1 are relatively
time-consuming as compared to “flat” feed-forward
processes. This renders percept-formation during UAL
temporally “thick.” Visual binding occurs at a (relatively)
late processing stage (Bodelón et al., 2007), and the increased
temporal durability of compound percepts based on back
and forth (reentrant) signaling is the basis of working
memory (Wang, 2001) and of trace conditioning (in which
there is a temporal gap between the US and the CS; Solomon
et al., 1986; Woodruff-Pak and Disterhoft, 2008; Dylla et al.,
2013).
(6) Selection and attention. Whereas any form of learning is,
by definition, selective (Changeux et al., 1973; Changeux
and Danchin, 1976; Skinner, 1984; Kandel, 2007), UAL,
requires a unique, complex mode of selection in which
compound information is learned, and learning occurs
only when the compound information signals unexpected
reward (as in prediction-error learning). This constraint
implies that most of the time learning is inhibited, since
many of the stimuli which the animal perceives, though
perfectly associated with the US, are not “surprising” (as
with blocking; see Kamin, 1969). A related requirement if
for top–down attention, which is considered by many to
be necessary for integrating multi-feature stimuli into a
compound (Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Huang and Pashler,
2007).
(7) Intentionality (Aboutness). Predictive-coding is intentional –
it is “about” the world and the body since it requires
models of the world, of the body, and of action, and
is based on mapping/modeling-relations between sensory
signals and their latent external causes (Summerfield et al.,
2006; Friston, 2009; Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013). UAL, which
necessitates and encompasses such modeling, ties the models
with the organism’s goals, as reflected by its bodily states and
motor activities, and is therefore intentional par excellence
(Brentano, 1874; Searle, 1983; Edelman, 2003; Freeman,
2003).
(8) Self and embodiment. UAL instantiates the philosophical
notion of self. “Minimal self,” as most clearly described
by Metzinger (2009) and Merker (2005, 2007, 2013),
requires a model of the integrated yet rapidly changing
world in which a model of the coordinated and flexibly
changing and moving body is nested. Such a nested
model provides a stable updateable perspective that enables
the flexible evaluation of the various changes in the
world–body relations. This notion of self can only be
achieved via hierarchical, multilayered predictive-coding,
allowing the animal to distinguish between the effects
of compound self-generated and world-generated stimuli.
Furthermore, comparing the actual sensory consequences
of the animal’s complex motor commands to those of
the sensory feedback that is predicted by its self-model
allows the animal to “predict” the effects of its own actions
(Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1971; Brembs and Heisenberg, 2000;
Jeannerod and Arbib, 2003; Brembs, 2008). The formation
and maintenance of complex body and world models,
and the distinction between self-produced and world-
produced sensory inputs, involve the integration of external-
world-derived and internal-world-derived stimuli along with
action patterns that are constantly updated, evaluated,
and compared with past learned memories (Botvinick and
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 December 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1954
fpsyg-07-01954 December 22, 2016 Time: 14:29 # 10
Bronfman et al. The Transition to Consciousness
Cohen, 1998; Ramachandran, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard,
2005; Blanke, 2012; Seth, 2013). The interactions between
the integrating units presented in Figure 1 constitute such
a self-model.
In summary, UAL seems to require an enabling system
with the properties and capacities that are deemed jointly
sufficient for minimal consciousness. Animals with an integrated
body, actions, and world models, that distinguish between self
and world and act according to reinforcement signals based
on these integrations in multiple domains of sensation and
action, can be said to have a self, and the nested neural
representations they form seem necessary for generating the
integrated sensory states that we call subjective experiences.
Although UAL is not to be equated with subjective experiencing
(just as a DNA replicating sub-system cannot be said to be
living), a UAL architecture in a biologically evolved system can
be the basis for the reverse engineering of an experiencing
system. This is analogous to a DNA replicating subsystem which
can be the basis for reverse-engineering its enabling system,
a living cell that includes metabolic cycles and membrane-
synthesis mechanisms. However, a genetic algorithm that
employs recombination and mutations in long strings of digits,
though implementing unlimited heredity, does not render the
computer chips within which it is implemented alive. Like the
cell, the UAL enabling system in an animal includes many crucial
additional components such as immune and hormonal factors
and bioelectric fields that unify the entire system at several
spatial and temporal scales and that must be constituents of a
reverse engineered minimally conscious system. Such factors may
not be necessary in an artificial system, and we are therefore
not suggesting that UAL is a sufficient condition for minimal
consciousness in artificial systems (see Verschure, 2016 for
an insightful discussion of the possibility of consciousness in
artificial systems), though we regard it as a sufficient condition
in biologically evolved ones.
Although our suggestion that UAL can serve as an
evolutionary marker of minimal consciousness does not imply
that we have solved the “hard problem” (Chalmers, 1997), our
model can contribute to the elucidation of the dynamics of
minimal consciousness. We believe that our proposal provides
an evolutionary-selective rationale for the emergence of the
structures and processes suggested by prominent models of
consciousness: Merker’s (2005, 2007, 2013) theory that focuses
on the interactions between the neural processes underlying
target selection, action selection and motivation; Changeux and
Dehaene’s Global Neural Workspace Model (Dehaene et al.,
1998; Dehaene, 2014) that emphasizes the integrative interactions
between perceptual, motor, attentional, memory and value
systems; and the Dynamic Core theory of Edelman (2003) that
underscores value systems, multi-level mapping and integrative
processes that relate compound inputs to past learning responses
and future needs.
As we show in the next section, our suggestion that
selection for UAL led to the evolution of minimal consciousness
and that UAL is its evolutionary transition marker may
have important implications concerning the distribution of
sentience in the living world and concerning research on animal
consciousness. Before we briefly discuss these implications,
however, we must clarify an issue that is a common source of
misunderstanding and describe how our perspective compares
with other frameworks that aim to account for phenomenal
consciousness.
Crucially, a capacity for UAL is a positive marker – its
presence can tell us that an animal is endowed with sentience,
but from its absence we cannot deduce that an animal is non-
sentient. Humans who are incapable of UAL, such as a neonates
or hydroanencephalics, can nonetheless be sentient (Merker,
2007), because they are equipped with a preexisting, evolved
and functional, UAL-supporting mechanisms that are in place
even when they are incapable of UAL for developmental or
pathological reasons. Just as a cell is considered alive even after its
nucleus has been removed (and hence it is lacking an unlimited
heredity system) but all or most of the other systems that had
evolved in the context of the evolution of unlimited heredity
are functioning, so an animal lacking a current capacity for
UAL (but exercising the capacities that were selected during the
evolution of UAL) can be considered sentient. Our argument is
that the evolutionary origins of UAL and its enabling system were
coupled and therefore that an organism with an evolutionary
capacity for UAL and an evolved enabling system will manifest
consciousness as well. Our answer to the question whether
animals with some but not all the components of UAL have
some level of sentience is that sentience will not be evolutionarily
sustainable in such animals since positive selection for UAL is
required for its maintenance. Just as a proto-cell with a limited
inheritance system may (arguably) be considered alive but will
go extinct if an unlimited heredity does not evolve, so a system
that has lost its capacity for UAL, will fail, over evolutionary
time, to sustain sentience. Moreover, our theory does not suggest
that unconscious processing of information is impossible once
the organism has the capacity for UAL. Rather, we predict that
such unconscious processing will not have the potential to yield
UAL.
While our approach builds on many current frameworks
for understanding minimal consciousness, it is also distinct
from them. The UAL functional architecture is, either implicitly
presupposed by several leading models of consciousness or is
compatible with them. For example, the global neural workspace
model (GNW) suggests that the perceptual, motor, memory,
value and attention systems come together to construct mental
states (Dehaene, 2014). These very same systems are part of
our UAL architecture, although in our model the coupling
among them is explicit: we specify the temporal and functional
relations between the relevant subsystems, with attention
instantiated by the precision of evaluating discrepancies, through
predictive coding. Similarly, our UAL model is compatible
with Gerald Edelman’s dynamic core model, which focuses
on value systems and multi-level mapping and integration
processes that relate compound inputs to learned responses and
anticipated (future) needs (Edelman, 2003). These dynamics
are explicitly accommodated by our model, which, in addition,
specifies the type of functional relations that can instantiate these
dynamics.
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A more recent model, Tononi’s integrated information
theory (IIT) of consciousness (Tononi et al., 2016), posits that
consciousness is based on composite, integrated (irreducible
to non-interdependent subsets), intrinsic cause-effect processes,
which exclude a lot of alternatives. This integrated information
(8) can be measured. Tononi focuses on the unity and
global accessibility aspects of consciousness (other features of
consciousness are seen as derivable from or implied by his
theory). Our suggested UAL architecture requires composition,
integration and exclusion of information as well, but our model
also explicitly includes other aspects of minimal consciousness,
such as the role of reinforcement and memory for compound
patterns.
Our UAL model is also strongly related to models that
emphasize the notion of an action-constructed bodily self. The
emotion-focused theory of Damasio highlights the perceptions
that the organism has of its own body through the continuous
monitoring of its internal state by the brain, which is represented
when objects in the external world modify this internal
perception (Damasio, 2010). In our model, the interactions of the
REIU system with the SIU and MIU systems (which are affected
by the MEMU) are compatible with Damasio’s suggestions. In
the UAL model, hierarchical representations are built into the
specific patterns of interaction between lower and higher sensory
and motor units.
Merker ’s (2007, 2013) model of consciousness, is perhaps the
closest to our UAL model. His tripartite target selection, action
selection and motivation are operationalized by our integrating
units and our REI unit. The motion-stabilized body-world
interface organized around an ego-center that Merker suggests
is, in our model, the outcome of a temporally specific efferent-
copy signaling. The stable perspective that the animal adopts also
depends on efferent copy signaling, as well as on continuous
updating of expectations via predictive coding.
Although compatible with Feinberg and Mallatt’s focus on
hierarchically organized neural maps, our account of minimal
consciousness and mental states is incompatible with their
distinction between separate types of affective, exteroceptive and
interoceptive consciousness (Feinberg and Mallatt, 2016; for a
similar distinction see Panksepp, 2005). According to our view,
all conscious states are sensory, all involve interactions with the
motor system, all involve memory for compound patterns, and
all are valued/stabilized. There are, of course, conscious mental
states that are primarily visual, auditory, or tactile, or experiences
that stem from responses to stimulations of receptors within the
body and changed states of the CNS, resulting in internal pains,
anxiety, imbalance and fatigue, but these distinctions do not
entail separate types of consciousness. All these experiences share
the same basic pattern of interactions depicted in the UAL model.
Clearly, the source of the sensory stimuli may be different under
different ecological conditions and for different animal taxa, and
the relative importance of the different integrating units that are
involved in processing particular experiences is therefore likely
to be different too. Although there are clearly many different
mental states, we believe that the idea that there are several types
of consciousness is an error stemming from the attribution of
consciousness to parts of the systems (to the activity of the REIU,
MNU and SIU) rather than to the activity of the system as a
whole.
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
A characterization of UAL at the functional–behavioral level
along the lines suggested in this paper, leads to a variety of testable
questions about the relation between consciousness and learning.
Our model predicts that first and second order learning about
novel compound percepts and actions requires sentience. This is
supported by the finding that masked, unconsciously perceived
and novel CSs, such as pictures of flowers or mushrooms do
not give rise to conditioning, while masked angry faces do
(Öhman and Soares, 1993). We hypothesize that the level of
perceptual integration of novel compound percepts is too low
to form an engram in the MEMU system, while preexisting
engrams of angry faces (or, we predict, an already consciously
learned compound) can be primed by even degraded signals.
Studies of this type need to be extended to test for second order
conditioning of novel and already-learned compound stimuli
and actions in both humans and animals (whose ability to
become conditioned to masked stimuli of different types was
not investigated). Second, we can test when during human
ontogeny UAL emerges, how language influences it, and if there
are lesions or other pathologies that interfere with it (some
studies begin to answer these question; see for example Kawai
et al. (2004), for tests of limited associative learning already
in chimpanzee fetuses, and evidence, for example by Winocur
and Eskes (1998) and Wang et al. (2015), that lesions of the
prefrontal cortex interfere with complex modes of associative
learning).
One important potential implication of our theory is that
it provides a theory-driven, explicit prediction regarding the
distribution of minimal consciousness in the animal kingdom.
The status of this question in the consciousness literature is
at present wide-open (see Liljenström and Århem, 2008 for
an exposition of the different views). Suggestions range from
attributing consciousness to linguistic animals (i.e., humans)
alone (Macphail, 1987) to all living creatures (Margulis, 2001) and
all matter (Chalmers, 1997).
If we accept that UAL is an evolutionary marker of minimal
consciousness, we can investigate its existence in the animal
kingdom and by extension address the distribution question.
A survey of the distribution of associative learning (both limited
and UAL) in the animal world suggests that this mode of learning
is found in at least six, possibly nine, different phyla (Corning
et al., 1973; Perry et al., 2013) and that limited AL probably first
evolved in the early Cambrian 540 million years ago (Ginsburg
and Jablonka, 2010a,b). The distribution of UAL has been less
systematically studied, but what we do know (see Table 2)
suggests that it evolved in the arthropods and the vertebrates
during the middle Cambrian period, shortly after these groups
evolved, and much later (about 250 million years later), in the
mollusks. If we are correct and UAL conferred a significant
evolutionary advantage during the Cambrian, we expect that
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species diversification in the fossil record would be particularly
evident in phyla of animals exhibiting UAL and interacting with
UAL animals.
We have suggested that increasingly open-ended associative
learning and minimal consciousness not only evolved during
the Cambrian, but that AL evolution itself may have been one
of the factors that drove the Cambrian explosion (Ginsburg
and Jablonka, 2007a,b, 2010a,b, 2015). The first part of our
suggestion, the idea that minimal consciousness emerged during
the Cambrian, is gaining support: According to Merker’s model
of the self, all vertebrates have minimal consciousness (Merker,
2007, 2013). Since this phylum evolved in the Cambrian, minimal
consciousness must have evolved in that taxon during that era.
This line of reasoning has now been extended to arthropods by
Barron and Klein (2016; Klein and Barron, 2016), who explicitly
suggest that the minimally conscious self originated in the
Cambrian in both vertebrates and insects. The same conclusion
has been reached by Feinberg and Mallatt (2013, 2016) on the
basis of their work on the brain structures and organization
supporting the hierarchical mapping of the world and the body
in vertebrates and in some invertebrates, as well as by Godfrey-
Smith (2016) who focuses on cephalopod consciousness. There is,
thus, is a small but growing convergence on a view that minimal
consciousness first evolved, in parallel, during the Cambrian era
in two animal phyla. Our second proposal, that the evolution of
learning was one of the factors that drove the Cambrian explosion
is at present still under-researched.
A related issue is linked to debates about the kind of primary
sensory experiences: were visual experiences primary? Or maybe
olfactory experiences came first? Or were the first experiences
interoceptive-affective? From our perspective, these debates miss
the integrative nature of all experiencing. Since movement and
valued sensory inputs are always involved in the construction of
consciousness, sensory signals from the surface of the moving
body, proprioceptive signals, and interoceptors’ signaling, have
contributed to all mental states. The relative significance and
richness of the exteroceptive signals in particular lineages
depended on the evolution of sensory receptors and processors
of that lineage, which was intimately related to its specific habitat.
A sense of balance and the ability to detect vibrations were
probably important in all moving animals, while in animals
living close to the water surface, eyes and visual experiences
were probably of special significance, and olfactory experiences
may have played a larger role in animals that moved on the
bottom of the sea where little light penetrated. Whatever the
sense/s most abundantly employed, it seems likely that all existing
types of exteroception and interoception contributed to the
ability of UAL animals to construct a multimodal representation
of its “self ” in the world. In all these animals, the default,
spontaneous exploratory activity that led to distinction between
self and world was rewarding – maybe even joyful, as Humphrey
(2011) suggested – encouraging the animal to engage with its
world.
The view we put forward has implications for the ongoing
debate about the function of consciousness. The usual argument
about the teleo-functions of consciousness is that since being
conscious originated at some point in the history of life and
has been maintained in at least some lineages, it stands to
reason that it has some functions. Seth (2009) reviewed various
ideas about the functions of consciousness and pointed to a
common thread in the thoughts of both philosophers of mind and
cognitive scientists: the function of consciousness is to integrate
information, resolve ambiguities, and enable novel, flexible and
goal-directed behavior; following Morsella (2005) he called this
broad, shared agreement, the “integration consensus.” Since our
argument was that a system enabling UAL entails the integration
of information, leads to a massive increase of discrimination, and
allows the generation of flexible goal-directed behavior, does it
follow that UAL is the “true” function of minimal consciousness?
The perspective we present in this paper suggests that asking
what is the function/s of consciousness is a misleading question
for the very same reason that asking what is the function of life is
misleading. Life has a goal, but no function: with the emergence
of life, a new teleological (goal-directed) order emerged. While
the subsystems of a living system like a cell have distinct activities
(e.g., metabolic cycles transform energy), these processes can be
considered functions only when they conjointly subserve the goal
of “survival and reproduction,” that is, when they dynamically
organize and enable the survival and reproduction of the cell
as a whole. The notion of biological teleo-function, ascribed to
parts or processes that comprise an entity, is, by definition, only
understandable within the contexts of a goal-directed system.
We suggest that consciousness, like life, is best regarded as
a goal-directed dynamic system rather than a functional trait.
Just as life, in which functions such as membrane-maintenance
and metabolism serve a telos of survival and reproduction,
the functions that operate within the framework set up by
consciousness, such as UAL (which involves perception, action
selection and motivation) serve a telos of ascribing values to
ontogenetically encountered and constructed compound objects,
actions or states.
Our approach also has ethical implications. Whereas some
biologists infer that animals like fish do not suffer pain because
they do not have a mammalian-like neo-cortical representation
of nociceptive stimuli (Rose, 2002; Key, 2016), like Merker
(2016) and many other biologists, we argue that sentience does
not require a mammalian neo-cortical organization. Clearly,
however, if an animal either lacks particular sensory receptors,
organs, or a neural architecture that leads to the processing of
specific inputs as conscious experiences, we do not expect the
animal to be conscious of these sensory inputs. However, given
our profound ignorance about most animals’ nociception, we
should prefer to err on the side of caution.
CONCLUSION
We offer a novel evolutionary perspective for studying
consciousness that proved successful when applied to the
study of life. Based on this heuristics, we suggest that UAL
is the evolutionary transition marker distinguishing between
organisms lacking consciousness, and minimally conscious, or
sentient, organisms. We describe the properties and functional
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organization of UAL, the neural substrates underlying it and
its distribution across the animal kingdom. We show that
the processes, structures and dynamic organization that enable
UAL, constitute an integrated functional system whose attributes
satisfy the list of properties that have been recognized as
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for instantiating
minimal consciousness in animals. We suggest that the evolution
of UAL was the selective context in which minimal consciousness
emerged, provide testable empirical predictions that are derived
from our model, and propose that consciousness first emerged
during the Cambrian era in arthropods and vertebrates and about
250 million years later in cephalopods. We see UAL as one of
the functions that minimal consciousness, an ontogenetic goal-
directed system, had afforded, and suggest that the emergence
of consciousness led to the generation of a new order of
things, to a new functional realm, altering the very notion of
being.
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